What We Still Don't Know about Monetary and Fiscal Policy by Benjamin M. Friedman
What We Still Don’t Know about
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
TWO THOUSAND AND SEVEN may seem an odd moment to question what
we know about monetary policy. The past quarter-century has been about
as good a run, at least in aggregate dimensions, as one is likely to get—
and certainly far superior to what the early Brookings Panel participants,
in the 1970s, ever thought likely. The United States has experienced only
two business recessions during the last twenty-ﬁve years, neither lasting
longer than eight months and neither involving a decline in total produc-
tion as great as 1
1⁄2 percent.1 Annual price inflation has converged onto a
1
1⁄2 to 2 percent norm, with the average increase apart from food and
energy (the U.S. central bank’s preferred measure) falling exactly in the
middle of this range over the past ten years and not a single year as much
as 
1⁄4 percentage point either above or below. Neither the severe one-day
stock market crash in October 1987, nor the collapse of a good portion of
the nation’s thrift deposit industry in the late 1980s, nor the protracted
stock market decline of 2000–03, nor the quadrupling of world oil prices
since 2002 had much, if any, visible impact on either aggregate nonﬁnan-
cial economic activity or economy-wide inﬂation. Euroland and most of
the world’s other advanced economies have enjoyed similarly favorable
rides, and even the one outstanding exception—Japan—proves the rule, in
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1. Output volatility has declined sharply on a more ﬁnely measured basis as well; see,
for example, Blanchard and Simon (2001).
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in knowledge about the subject, and even to refer to monetary policy, as
practiced today, as a science.
2
Fiscal policy today likewise seems on a surer footing of knowledge than
in earlier eras. Despite the expense of simultaneously ﬁghting two wars, and
despite a tax cut that had put the U.S. government’s budget on a path toward
deﬁcit even before either war began, the ratio of the government’s outstand-
ing interest-bearing debt to national income has ﬂuctuated narrowly within
the range of 0.33 to 0.37 since the beginning of the decade. (The govern-
ment’s unfunded liabilities, mostly for Social Security and Medicare, are
another matter, but lack of knowledge is not the problem.) The experience of
2001, recalling that of 1981, has even led to some talk of tax cuts in particu-
lar as potentially efﬁcacious in spurring recovery from recessions. For the
most part, however, ﬁscal policy has mostly disappeared from discussion at
both the popular and the academic levels.
Well-earned complacency notwithstanding, some modest reflection
suggests that despite the recent gains in knowledge, several questions of
some seriousness, about both monetary and fiscal policy, remain to be
answered. Some are primarily conceptual, while others spring more directly
from operational concerns. But in both of these policy areas, experience sug-
gests that often what starts out as a largely conceptual inquiry leads, in time,
to implications with practical import.
A Conceptual Question: How Does the Central Bank Make
Monetary Policy in the First Place?
Most economics textbooks introduce the role of monetary policy by
deriving one or more sources of demand for the central bank’s liabilities:
banks need reserves to satisfy reserve requirements and to settle interbank
transactions, the nonbank public needs currency to conduct everyday
business, and so on. The next step is to posit, reasonably enough, that the
central bank is a monopoly supplier of its own liabilities and therefore
can, unless directed otherwise by higher authorities, set that supply at
whatever level it chooses. Because both the banks’ and the nonbank pub-
lic’s demand for the central bank’s liabilities is likely to be interest sensi-
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2. The most widely cited example is probably Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).
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price at which these liabilities are exchanged for other assets: conceptu-
ally, some kind of interest rate. Given the role of interest rates and asset
returns more generally in affecting aggregate demand, the economic
consequences of monetary policy actions—that is, of changes in the sup-
ply of central bank liabilities—follow with however much elaboration seems
appropriate.
This idealized story bears essentially no resemblance to how most central
banks today go about either formulating or conducting monetary policy.
True, there was a time when many central banks, including the Federal
Reserve System, carried out monetary policy either by setting the quantity or
the rate of growth of the monetary base or by targeting the growth of some
related measure of deposit money. But most central banks, including the
Federal Reserve, gave up that practice some time ago. Instead most central
banks today make monetary policy by setting some designated short-term
interest rate (in the United States, the federal funds rate).
3
According to standard representations, whether the central bank sets
the quantity of its liabilities or the price at which those liabilities exchange
for other assets is irrelevant except for stochastic considerations. (In the
United States the federal funds rate is the price for borrowing central bank
reserves overnight.) The central bank can set the quantity and let the mar-
ket determine the equilibrium price, or it can set the price and let the mar-
ket determine the equilibrium quantity. Either way, what the central bank
is doing amounts to picking a point on the demand curve that it faces.
Whether the supply curve it imposes is vertical or horizontal, or perhaps
upward sloping, is of no consequence (again except for stochastic implica-
tions). What matters is only the point at which that supply curve intersects
the demand curve.
The most glaring lacuna separating this idealized representation from
reality is the implication that, unless the demand curve for central bank
liabilities is nearly vertical, changing the interest rate requires nontrivial
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3. For simplicity, the discussion here takes the interest rate as a primitive for purposes
of monetary policy. There is, of course, an extensive literature on the determination of
monetary policy as either a rule or, more generically, a reaction function, in either case
based on economic developments to which policymakers respond. The most familiar exam-
ple today is probably Taylor (1993), but the literature adopting this approach to monetary
policymaking is much older; see, for example, Reuber (1964), Goldfeld and Blinder (1972),
and Friedlaender (1973).
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words, open market operations. In fact, today most central banks need to
undertake little if any market intervention to change the designated policy
interest rate. A mere announcement is normally sufﬁcient.
4 Indeed, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports that in recent years even the
announcement is often unnecessary. When a change in the Federal Open
Market Committee’s target for the federal funds rate is widely antici-
pated, market participants typically move the actual rate to the expected
new target rate even before the committee has met to change the target.
5
Increasingly, the operating arm of the central bank is not the trading desk
but the press ofﬁce.
Any of several different hypotheses might explain this phenomenon,
but most raise more questions than they answer, and in any case none
bears much connection to the way in which standard economic models
introduce the role of the central bank. To begin, perhaps the demand for
central bank liabilities actually is (approximately) vertical. One immediate
difﬁculty, however, is that a large body of both theory and empirical research
has consistently indicated signiﬁcant negative interest elasticity in banks’
demand for reserves and even, albeit to a lesser extent, in the public’s demand
for currency. Further, a nearly vertical demand for central bank liabilities
would imply that even very small changes in reserve quantities, not matched
by shifts in the demand curve, would lead to huge interest rate ﬂuctuations—
a plainly counterfactual proposition. Although most central banks today
do a pretty good job of anticipating the day-to-day demand curve shifts
that occur for a variety of technical reasons (shifts from one kind of
deposit to another, changes in the government’s cash balance, fluctua-
tions in the float, gold flows, and so forth), no one pretends that this
activity has achieved perfection. An explanation that implies large inter-
est rate fluctuations any time the trading desk’s daily technical estimate
is off by a billion dollars or two is hardly satisfactory.
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4. What is at issue here is movements along the demand curve for central bank liabili-
ties. By contrast, as the experience of heightened market volatility just this past summer, in
both the United States and Europe, has again shown, shifts in the demand curve are occa-
sionally substantial, especially under conditions of falling prices for highly leveraged assets.
Hence it sometimes takes large changes in the quantity of central bank reserves to maintain
the policy interest rate at a given level.
5. See Hilton (2005). The bank has conﬁrmed that the same pattern has also prevailed
since then; see Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2007).
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the central bank can carry out open market operations on even a vast scale,
it is not necessary to do so: the mere threat is sufﬁcient.
6 Although this idea
may seem plausible at ﬁrst thought, it, too, is highly problematic. There is
a difference between saying that private sector agents (in this case banks
and other investors) are price takers in some market and saying that they
take whatever price they are given without adjusting their portfolios accord-
ingly. This explanation is also inconsistent with the fact that, from time to
time, shifts in the demand for central bank liabilities do require sizable
open market operations merely to maintain the existing policy interest rate
(as was the case, most recently, in the summer of 2007).
Alternatively, once one leaves currency aside (and no central bank
attempts to make monetary policy by rationing the supply of its currency),
in many countries the remainder of the central bank’s liabilities bulk
sufficiently small that, even with an interest-elastic demand, only small
changes in supply are needed to change the price. Reserves held by U.S.
commercial banks and other depository institutions at year-end 2006
totaled only $43 billion. Moreover, because $35 billion of this amount
consisted of vault cash, the amount held as balances with the Federal
Reserve System was only $8 billion. Just as the Federal Reserve (or, for
that matter, even some large private collector) could presumably set the
price of buffalo nickels wherever it chose by means of transactions that
look tiny compared to the size of the U.S. economy, perhaps the Federal
Reserve can manipulate this tiny market in the same way.
But no one believes that changing the price of buffalo nickels would
have any impact on the broader vector of asset prices and interest rates
that matter for purposes of inﬂuencing aggregate demand. The market for
buffalo nickels is, in effect, “decoupled” from the asset markets more
generally—or at least it would be if either the Federal Reserve or a large
private collector were to manipulate their price in that way.
7 By contrast,
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6. Sometimes, of course, knowledge of the possibility of genuinely large-scale open
market operations is important; presumably this was the point of Ben Bernanke’s (2002)
statement (as a Federal Reserve governor, not yet chairman) that “the U.S. government has
a technology, called a printing press . . . that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it
wishes at essentially no cost.” But that context was different from simply setting the federal
funds rate by making announcements. More generically, see Goodhart (2000) for a discus-
sion of this issue.
7. See Friedman (2000) for a more extended discussion of the concept of decoupling in
this context.
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of monetary policy is precisely that changes in this price are presumed to
have an inﬂuence on other interest rates and asset demands.
A yet more novel explanation, suggested by Michael Woodford,
8 is that
because what is at issue is the central bank’s liabilities, private sector
agents have no basis on which to price them in relation to other assets until
the central bank itself gives them guidance. At the broadest level, Wood-
ford’s suggestion amounts to saying that the private sector’s demand for
central bank liabilities—to recall, the basis on which standard models intro-
duce the role for monetary policy—is strictly notional (or, again, decou-
pled from other markets based on economic fundamentals), presumably
because the services that those reserves provide have no intrinsic value.
The case is similar to that of certain artistic creations: as if buyers have no
way to judge whether a painting is worth $10,000 or $10,000,000 until the
gallery selling it tells them what to think; and, moreover, they are prepared
to change their minds on the matter whenever the gallery owner says so.
A perhaps more plausible interpretation of Woodford’s idea is that
because the liabilities being priced are nominal, and the central bank ulti-
mately controls the economy’s inﬂation rate, market participants know
that the value of these liabilities in terms of other assets can be whatever
the central bank wants. (This is yet a different way of saying that they have
no intrinsic value.) But, to recall, the price being established is the rate at
which overnight reserves exchange with other nominal assets. Further,
because these are overnight obligations, and inﬂation over the relevant time
horizon is not practically subject to central bank control anyway, investors
presumably compare the real return on these assets with the returns on
other assets as determined by fundamental economic considerations of
thrift, productivity, and risk.
It should go without saying, although sometimes these things are impor-
tant to say nonetheless, that the point of this line of inquiry is not that
economists interested in monetary policy should follow “bumblebee” logic
and deny that the central bank can set its policy interest rate. (A wide-
spread myth has it that, according to accepted principles of aeronautical
engineering, it is impossible for a bumblebee to ﬂy. Yet bumblebees do
ﬂy, and central banks do set, and from time to time change, their policy
interest rate.) Rather, the point is that when economists use models that
54 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
8. Woodford (2000).
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they should be prepared to entertain the “How do they do that?” question.
And to the extent that the answer implicit in most familiar treatments fails
to meet the minimum requirements of plausibility in the world in which
central banks make monetary policy today, that situation stands as a chal-
lenge to economic thinking.
An Empirical Question: Where, and How, Does Monetary Policy
Bite on the Real Economy?
The early years of the Brookings Papers coincided with a ﬂorescence of
work aimed at pinning down quantitatively the ways in which monetary
policy inﬂuences nonﬁnancial economic activity, and the ﬁnancial chan-
nels through which that inﬂuence takes place. Under the leadership of
Franco Modigliani, often in collaboration with Albert Ando, researchers at
the Federal Reserve and throughout the academic world built on then-new
theoretical developments (for example, the permanent income hypothesis)
and advances in empirical techniques (for example, in estimating systems
of simultaneous equations) to examine systematically the various “chan-
nels” by which the central bank’s actions inﬂuence the economy. For some
purposes, of course, merely knowing the magnitude and timing of the
aggregate impact would be sufﬁcient. But in other contexts knowing what
share of the impact would fall on business investment, or homebuilding, or
consumer spending is of interest as well. Further, having some sense of
the contents of the “black box” enhances the confidence to be attached
even to aggregate estimates. Although no concise summary would do
justice to the ﬁndings of such a broad-based empirical research program, 
two principal emphases emerged: the importance of impacts on consumer
spending that took place through changes in asset values, primarily in the
stock market; and the impact of deposit ﬂows on residential construction,
mostly as a result of institutional imperfections in the mortgage market.
Conversely, the ﬁndings of this work mostly downplayed the straight-
forward interest elasticity of business investment, which had received much
of the attention earlier in the post–World War II period.
9
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9. The initial reports were presented in DeLeeuw and Gramlich (1968, 1969), but in
subsequent years this effort spawned numerous publications.
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markets and the abolition of then-existing regulation have removed much
of what James Tobin used to call the “sand in the wheels” that once gave
monetary policy much of its bite. Most obviously, the establishment of a
secondary market in home mortgages, supported by massive securitization
through the federally sponsored companies, together with the removal of
regulatory ceilings on interest paid on some key categories of deposits, has
mostly eliminated the disintermediation of liabilities from mortgage-
issuing depository institutions that gave the housing market such pro-
nounced sensitivity to swings in short-term interest rates. And securitization
has extended well beyond the mortgage market. Today consumer loans, car
loans, ordinary commercial and industrial loans, and many other standard
forms of credit that originating lenders traditionally had to retain on their
own balance sheet—even “distressed” loans—all readily trade in securitized
form.
10
The development of traded options and other derivative contracts is
perhaps even more fundamental. To be sure, options (and futures) make it
possible for both ﬁrms and individuals to hedge risks that they normally
face. But the availability of these contracts also allows investors, if they
choose, to take on pure risk unrelated to their underlying economic situation.
Although the conventional assumption among economists is that specula-
tion dominates hedging only when such markets are in an immature state,
this conclusion remains as yet unsupported by experience. Credit derivatives
are especially interesting in a monetary policy context, in that they under-
mine traditional presumptions about who bears the risk of default: the fact
that a bank is the lead lender to some ﬁrm no longer bears any clear impli-
cation about whether that bank (or any other participating lender) is at risk
if the ﬁrm were to default on its obligations.
The advancing globalization of economic activity in general and ﬁnan-
cial markets in particular, together with the unpegging of exchange rates
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s,
matters in each of these contexts and more besides. In the United States
the share of the economy’s markets for goods and services that is exposed
to international competition, roughly approximated by the sum of imports
56 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
10. The idea that the economy may be evolving in these respects is hardly new. See
Friedman (1989) for one attempt to measure the changes in the various ways in which
monetary policy is effective. There have been many others.
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more than 25 percent today. Hence the potential effectiveness of mone-
tary policy working through exchange rate changes is presumably that
much greater (although there is evidence that the pass-through of exchange
rate movements in the pricing of U.S. imports is often limited). Moreover,
currency rates have fluctuated widely. For example, from the inception
of the euro in 1999 to November 2007, the dollar-euro rate has swung
between 0.84 and 1.46.
Economists’ concern with links among international markets in the
context of monetary policy has also traditionally focused on “currency
substitution” (which, as a practical matter, is really about deposits).
Indeed, the increasing ease of currency substitution—along with innova-
tions in deposit taking and the removal of regulation—was part of the
reason for the collapse of the empirical relationships between various
measures of money and either income or prices, which in turn led most
central banks in the 1980s to dump their money growth targets in favor
of setting an interest rate. In the absence of money growth targets, today
the globalization of financial markets matters for monetary policy pri-
marily on the asset side of institutions’ balance sheets: what is the point
of making credit more expensive in the United States if borrowers can
easily find accommodation, at unchanged terms, from lenders abroad?
Further, as recent experience has demonstrated, international redistribu-
tion of risks also matters. Not only is Enron’s lead bank not necessarily
at risk if the company defaults; it is entirely possible that no U.S. institu-
tion bears that risk.
Lessons learned from empirical research done a generation ago are there-
fore no longer reliable guides to the structure of monetary policy’s inﬂuence
on nonﬁnancial economic activity. To be sure, the Federal Reserve Board
staff continues to maintain and update a macroeconometric model that repre-
sents the direct descendant of the original Modigliani-Ando-DeLeeuw-
Gramlich-Pierce-Enzler-et al. enterprise. But models of this kind have
mostly vanished from the purview of academic and academic-style research
and debate in economics, and so even that effort has neither widely informed
current thinking on such matters nor beneﬁted from the usual process of
evaluation, critique, and discussion.
11
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econometric modeling from the purview of the academic economic profession.
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consumer spending via stock prices looms all the larger today, now that
institutional changes have blunted what used to be sizable rationing effects
operating through the mortgage market (although not the elasticity of
housing demand with respect to interest rates per se), this story has always
been problematic in light of the limited overlap between who owns the
stocks and who does the consuming. Although 49 percent of all American
families now own stocks either directly or through mutual funds or retire-
ment accounts (the percentage was far smaller when this research was
done years ago), the median family holding is only $24,000.
12 By contrast,
the top 1 percent of households own 53 percent of all common stock held
by households outside of retirement accounts, and 48 percent when stock
held in retirement accounts is included.
13
Roughly half of the impact of monetary policy via this channel,
therefore, in principle represents the behavior of a very small number of
people who hold very large amounts of assets. There is no reason to sup-
pose that the individuals and families in this group are immune from the
effect of changes in the value of the assets they own, as spelled out in the
usual permanent income (or life cycle) model. But it is also implausible
to suppose that these large-quantity asset holders regularly adjust their
consumption in response to valuation changes over the fairly short time
horizons typically considered in empirically estimated models of the
economy’s response to monetary policy. Neither Bill Gates nor Warren
Buffett is going to decide whether to buy a new car, or take a vacation,
or give a party this year because the value of his stock portfolio has
changed.
By contrast, for the bulk of the population of stockholders, even if
they take fully into account any fluctuations in the value of assets held
in their retirement funds (already a dubious assumption), the amounts
involved are too small to deliver the estimated aggregate response of con-
sumer spending. For a $24,000 holding, even a 10 percent change in value
is just $2,400; multiplying by 0.03, the usual one-year impact coefﬁcient
found in this kind of research, gives a one-year consumption change of
only $72 per family. And for the 51 percent of families who own no stocks
58 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
12. These figures are based on the Federal Reserve’s latest Survey of Consumer
Finances; see Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2006).
13. See Poterba (2000).
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standard story is zero.
None of this means, of course, that changes in stock prices might not
imply changes in consumer behavior through some other channel—for
example, even people who own no stock might interpret observed stock
price changes as informative about future economic conditions and adjust
their behavior accordingly. Nor does it rule out that stock price changes
might simply be correlated with consumer behavior out of common depen-
dence on some unspeciﬁed inﬂuence. But neither of those ideas is the same
as the standard (for the last thirty or so years) story that monetary policy
exerts its largest effect by changing stock prices, which in turn affect con-
sumer spending along permanent income or life cycle lines.
A Policy Question: Is Inﬂation Targeting Consistent with a Dual
Mandate for Monetary Policy?
Inﬂation targeting has become one of the most signiﬁcant developments
of recent decades in both the theory and the practice of monetary policy.
A rapidly expanding literature has analyzed the a priori properties and
the practical consequences of various inﬂation targeting strategies, and an
increasing number of central banks around the world—at last count roughly
two dozen, in both the advanced economies and the developing world—
have adopted one form or another of this strategy as the basic framework
governing the formulation and implementation of their monetary policy. It
is hardly surprising that one now sees frequent calls for the Federal Reserve
System to join the parade and restructure U.S. monetary policy, too, within
the guidelines of some form of inﬂation targeting. The recent change in
leadership at the Federal Reserve has made the issue all the more promi-
nent: former chairman Alan Greenspan opposed inflation targeting, but
Ben Bernanke favors it.
Much of the discussion of this subject, within both the central banking
and the academic communities, has focused on the empirical question of
the consequences of adopting inﬂation targeting: Does doing so actually
help a country reduce its average rate of inﬂation, or the volatility of inﬂa-
tion around that average, or is the role of inﬂation targeting more to lock
in place gains in this arena already won? What consequences follow for
the average level, or the volatility, of real outcomes such as growth and
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suring the amount of output, or of employment, that an economy must
forgo in order to reduce inﬂation from some embedded average rate to a
lower average, or even to bring inﬂation back to a given long-run average
after a temporary departure? More speciﬁcally for current U.S. purposes,
what is the appeal of inﬂation targeting for a country that has already—
indeed, long since—achieved a low and stable rate of inﬂation without any
changes in its monetary policymaking institutions? Empirical research has
delivered mixed and conﬂicting results on each of these questions.
14
The U.S. central bank is unusual in that, under the prevailing legisla-
tion by which the Congress has delegated this important policymaking
power to the Federal Reserve, the central bank is instructed to conduct
monetary policy so as to promote both maximum employment and stable
prices.
15 This “dual mandate,” as it is often called, stands in contrast to the
charge given many other countries’ central banks to focus primarily or
even exclusively on maintaining stable prices. The Bank of England’s
“remit,” for example, instructs that central bank to achieve price stability
and only then, to whatever extent is possible within the price stability con-
straint, to seek favorable outcomes for real economic activity. The Euro-
pean Central Bank’s charter is ambiguous about whether price stability is
to be that central bank’s only objective or merely the (overwhelmingly)
lead one within a strict hierarchy.
As Arthur Okun and Franco Modigliani, and especially James Tobin,
frequently reminded us, the purpose of any nation’s economic policy is to
advance its economic well-being, meaning the prosperity of its citizens
and the vitality of the institutions through which they participate in eco-
nomic activity, both in the present and for the future. Whether working
men and women are able to make a living, whether the businesses that they
own and at which they work can earn a proﬁt and invest adequately for
60 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
14. Compare, for example, the ﬁndings reported in Ball and Sheridan (2003) with those
of Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004).
15. The legislation also includes a third objective: low long-term interest rates. Most
practically oriented discussions ignore this part of the mandate, however, both because this
objective is largely redundant (given the inclusion of maximum employment and price sta-
bility) and because, to the extent that it is not redundant, there is little if anything that mon-
etary policy—as distinct from the Federal Reserve’s management of its asset porfolio, for
example—can do to achieve it.
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which both individuals and businesses rely can survive in the face of the
risk taking that is central to their reason for existing are all fundamental
aspects of that well-being. Individual citizens are, and have a right to be,
concerned with many facets of the economic environment in which they
live: their incomes, their employment prospects, their ability to start a busi-
ness or to borrow to purchase a new home, just to name a few. Monetary
policymakers also have both practical and historical reasons for seeking to
maintain the vitality of ﬁnancial institutions and the functioning of ﬁnan-
cial markets. As the collapse of the savings and loan industry in the late
1980s once again showed, the impairment of an economy’s banking system
can interrupt the credit creation process, destroy asset values, and otherwise
impede the ability of households and ﬁrms to carry out their ordinary eco-
nomic affairs.
Experience shows that rising (or falling) prices can and sometimes do
undermine the efﬁciency of economic activity, and therefore price stabil-
ity is a key desideratum in all of these regards. But price stability is instru-
mental, valued not for itself but for how it enhances an economy’s capacity
to achieve those goals that, even if they are not genuinely primary from the
perspective of basic human concerns, are at least instrumental at a higher
level. The idea that economic policy should pursue price stability as a
means of promoting more fundamental economic well-being, either cur-
rently or in the future, is not ground for pursuing price stability at the
expense, much less to the exclusion, of that more fundamental economic
well-being.
Further, it is not legitimate to duck the question of whether and how
monetary policy should seek to affect real economic outcomes by subsum-
ing that question within the prior one of whether monetary policy can do
so. Both theory and evidence indicate that, in an economy like that of the
United States, monetary policy can affect not just prices but also output,
employment, and other important aspects of nonﬁnancial economic activ-
ity, and can affect them over at least some signiﬁcant period.
16 The rele-
vant question is in what way it should seek to do so.
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the question at issue here is to take
seriously—if only brieﬂy—the opposite prospect: Imagine that the House
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Reserve’s chairman for his or her semiannual report on monetary policy.
Suppose that the economy had been spiraling downward for nearly a year,
the unemployment rate were in double digits, industrial production were
sharply down from the previous peak, corporate bankruptcies and home
mortgage foreclosures were accelerating, and banks were beginning to fail
in large numbers. And now suppose that, in the midst of this economic dis-
aster, the Federal Reserve chairman were to begin his or her testimony as
follows: “I am pleased to report that during the past year U.S. monetary
policy has been outstandingly successful. Overall inﬂation has again been
just 1.0 percent, and prices other than for food and energy have risen by
just 0.9 percent. My colleagues and I are here to accept this committee’s
congratulations and those of the American people.”
Such a situation is, of course, unthinkable. But the relevant question is
what makes it so. More speciﬁcally, to the extent that the dual mandate
that Congress has assigned to the Federal Reserve System is an important
element underpinning the implausibility of such a perverse fantasy, the
question is whether inﬂation targeting is consistent with monetary policy-
making under a dual mandate.
In principle, as many advocates of inﬂation targeting have emphasized,
inﬂation targeting need not imply that the chosen inﬂation rate is policy-
makers’ sole objective, and so in principle an inﬂation targeting regime
can be consistent with a dual mandate.
17 With only one instrument at their
disposal, it is possible (apart from situations of model degeneracy) for
monetary policymakers to describe their intended economic trajectory in
terms of only one variable.
18 The appeal of doing so in terms of inﬂation,
rather than output or employment, rests on the presumption that in the long
run monetary policy cannot affect those real outcomes, which instead 
ultimately depend only on factors such as endowments, preferences, and
technologies. Hence, by choosing inﬂation for this purpose, policymakers
are focusing on a variable that monetary policy can inﬂuence not just over
the medium horizon but in the long run as well.
Advocates of inﬂation targeting, both within central banks and among
academic researchers, mostly ground the argument in its favor on consid-
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17. See, for example, King (1997), who famously coined the phrase “inﬂation nutter”
to refer to a policymaker having objectives with respect to inﬂation only.
18. The basic principle is due to Tinbergen (1952). 
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transparency of an inflation targeting strategy fails, however—and with
it the argument for greater resulting accountability—when policymakers
have objectives for real economic outcomes, as under the dual mandate
that Congress has assigned to the Federal Reserve. In that case inflation
targeting is more likely to undermine the transparency of monetary policy
than to promote it.
The chief reason is that under inﬂation targeting policymakers normally
reveal to the public only one of their multiple objectives: that for inﬂation.
If outsiders knew (and were able to use) the economic model on which 
policymakers rely in evaluating potential actions, the public could infer
what path for output or employment, or any other variable of interest, would
be expected to accompany the targeted inﬂation trajectory. (They could
also back out the central bank’s intended path for interest rates.) But few
central banks operate with such a single economic model, and further, few
disclose this information anyway. Nor do inﬂation-targeting central banks
quantify for the public—or, normally, even for themselves—the relative
importance that they attach to their objectives for inﬂation and for real eco-
nomic outcomes.
19
To the contrary, most inﬂation-targeting central banks at least appear to
go to some effort not to reveal such aspects of their policymaking to the
public, and indeed to avoid giving any impression that considerations other
than preserving price stability ﬁgure importantly, or even at all, in their deci-
sions. An increasingly common practice, for example, following the initial
lead of the Bank of England, is to issue at regular intervals a detailed mon-
etary policy report, but to call it an “Inﬂation Report”—as if inﬂation were
the only aspect of economic activity of concern to monetary policy. Simi-
larly, many inﬂation-targeting central banks, in the public explanation that
they provide of the rationale underlying their monetary policy strategy, as
well as in their public statements about monetary policy more generally,
avoid any reference to the possibility of tension, even in the short run,
between their inﬂation objective and any real outcome.
In light of the favorable effect on short-run inﬂation-output trade-offs
that standard forward-looking representations of the price setting process,
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19. Using just this line of reasoning, Lars Svensson has advocated having the central
bank be speciﬁc internally in all of these respects and publicly disclose all of this informa-
tion; see, most recently, Svensson (2007).
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of future inﬂation anchored at a low level, the incentive for policymakers
to downplay or even conceal their objectives for real economic outcomes
is clear enough.
20 But their doing so hardly contributes to the transparency
of their policy. In parallel, if policymakers have objectives for both inﬂa-
tion and real outcomes, but disclose only their inﬂation objective, then
Congress as well as the general body politic can hold them accountable in
an explicit way at most for their success or failure in meeting their inﬂa-
tion objective; the rest must rely on inference and guesswork.
Whether inﬂation targeting is consistent with a U.S.-type dual mandate
for monetary policy, and to what extent inﬂation targeting leads to desir-
able properties of monetary policy when the central bank does operate
under a dual mandate, are therefore questions of some seriousness for the
United States. Given the time horizons over which the key processes at
issue play out—importantly including matters of public perception and 
of central bank accountability, to higher political authority as well as to
ﬁnancial market participants and the general public—it is not a question
to be lightly addressed by experimentation. Nor does most of the conven-
tional empirical research methodology that economists employ naturally
lend itself to being informative on the issue. Yet the stakes are high, and
so whatever light future research can shed on the question is well worth
the effort.
And Two Questions about Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy as such has generated little interest in the United States in
recent years, apart from the ongoing discussion of what to do about the
unsustainable trajectories for Social Security and especially Medicare. Yet
two questions—one about policymaking over business cycle frequencies
and one about the long run—seem pertinent today.
At the time of the Brookings Papers’ inception, many economists saw
deliberate variation in either tax or spending policy as a useful means to
help dampen unwanted ﬂuctuations in aggregate economic activity. The
idea was an old one, especially as it involved government spending, and
64 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
20. For example, see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).
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the Works Progress Administration in putting people to work and adding
to aggregate demand during the recovery from the 1930s’ depression had
lent it further credibility. Investment tax credits, aimed at influencing
the timing of business capital spending with the same goal in mind, also
seemed to be a useful tool (and they fit well within the cost-of-capital
approach to modeling investment). Nor was the purpose always to be
stimulative: in 1968 the government had imposed a temporary income
tax surcharge aimed at preventing aggregate demand from exceeding
full-employment benchmarks at the height of the Vietnam War effort. In
time, however—and partly as a result of the perceived failure of the 1968
measure—economists lost interest in the idea of using discretionary ﬁscal
actions for countercyclical stabilization. One reason was the longstanding
concern with both the delay in decisionmaking and the lags with which
policy, once decided, affected the economy (the so-called “inside” and
“outside” lags, respectively), in the context of difﬁculty in predicting what
shocks to the economy would need to be offset when. Numerous studies
of that time examined the record of various ﬁscal actions to see whether
they took place during recessions, or if not, then how far into the recovery
they occurred, and whether they managed to stimulate aggregate demand
within the subsequent recovery. But theory mattered as well. If consumers
behaved according to the permanent income (or the life cycle) model, the
impact on their spending due to tax changes not believed to be permanent
would be minor.
What has put this issue back on the agenda today, or at least on the
fringes of it, is the experience of 1981 and, most recently, 2001. In both
instances the economy was in recession. In both instances Congress
enacted sizable tax cuts while the recession was still in progress. And in
both instances the tax cuts evidently boosted aggregate demand and hence
helped accelerate the return to full employment. For a variety of reasons,
these two episodes may not be informative—at least not in terms of the
traditional debate over the potential efficacy of discretionary counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. The intent of the framers of both the 1981 and the
2001 tax cuts was to make them permanent. Further, both measures were
“in the pipeline,” having already been advocated for reasons having noth-
ing to do with combating recession, well before the recession began. But
that is almost always true. Many people in the United States, including
many holders of political ofﬁce, would like to cut tax rates further, while
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groups consist largely of people who intend the cuts, or the increases, that
they advocate to be permanent. The motivating goal is not to rectify any
deﬁciency or excess of aggregate demand but to address some longer-run
issue: reducing disincentives for private economic initiative, or narrowing
the government’s fiscal imbalance. Similarly, there is never any lack 
of proposals for new government spending programs. (Asymmetrically,
despite the usual rhetoric about reducing government spending, there are
normally very few concrete proposals to eliminate or reduce existing pro-
grams.) It is not difﬁcult, therefore, to picture a ready supply of proposals
that have been offered on other grounds and are waiting to be adopted,
just as the 1981 and 2001 tax cuts were, at a time when they might be use-
ful for this supplementary purpose. The question is whether the system-
atic use of such measures would be a positive addition to the arsenal of
economic policy.
Finally, what about the long run? Early participants on the Brookings
Panel had seen the U.S. government’s interest-bearing debt decline
from more than one dollar for every dollar of a year’s national income,
at the end of World War II, to less than 30 cents per dollar of national
income. The reason was not budget surpluses, but simply deficits that
were almost always small enough to keep the stock of debt growing
more slowly than the economy grew in nominal terms. Over the next
decade the ratio moved little, and by the beginning of the 1980s it stood
at 0.26. Few economists anticipated the near doubling (to 0.49) that
took place during the Reagan-Bush Sr. years. Likewise, few anticipated
the Clinton surpluses that then brought the ratio back down. Today the
government’s debt ratio stands at 0.37, having been as low as 0.33 at the
beginning of this decade.
Other advanced industrial countries today exhibit widely varying
amounts of government debt outstanding compared with their total pro-
duction and income. Japan’s reported government debt-to-income ratio
(as of 2006) is the highest, at 1.79 (although this ﬁgure is not comparable
to the U.S. equivalent for a variety of reasons, most prominently the
inclusion of debt held in government-owned accounts). In Italy the debt
ratio today is 1.20—higher than America’s was at the end of World War II.
In Belgium it is 0.91. At the other end of the scale, the debt ratio is only
0.16 in Australia, 0.25 in New Zealand, and 0.30 in Ireland. Among the
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0.71 in Germany, and 0.47 in the United Kingdom.
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The question is whether any of this matters. Clearly many people think
it does. In the United States, discussion of either Social Security or
Medicare routinely emphasizes the explosive trajectory for the govern-
ment’s debt ratio implicit in maintaining the current structure of these
programs as the population ages. In Europe one of the stated criteria
determining a country’s eligibility to join the new common currency, as
speciﬁed under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, was that its government debt
ratio be 0.60 or below, or at least that the country be making progress
toward that goal.
For purposes of short-run analysis, what matters about the government
debt ratio is not so much its level but whether it is rising or falling. This dis-
tinction, however, is just the same as whether the government’s budget deﬁcit
is large or small, and so what is involved in terms of economic effect is no
more than the usual analytics of how budget deﬁcits matter. In the United
States, with approximately $5 trillion of government debt now held by the
public, and with the economy growing at a nominal rate of approximately
6 percent a year (the average over the past two years), a rising or falling
government debt ratio merely means that the annual deﬁcit is above or
below $300 billion, respectively.
But what about the long run? Presumably the government debt ratio
cannot rise (or fall) indeﬁnitely; that is the point of the usual discussion of
Social Security and Medicare. Equilibrium requires some stable level.
Wholly apart from whether the ratio is rising or falling in any particular
span of a few years, does it matter whether a country has outstanding gov-
ernment debt equal to half a year’s national income, or twice that income?
And if so, how does it matter?
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Issues of measurement (including the treatment of government debt held in government-
owned accounts, differences in what debt is issued by the central government and what by
the equivalent of state or local governments, and the like) prevent these ﬁgures from being
anything more than suggestive of the relevant cross-country differences. A more fundamental
question is whether countries that participate in the European common currency any longer
have genuine “government debt” in the traditional sense; from a conceptual standpoint,
the obligations issued by these governments are more like state or municipal bonds in the
American context.
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although the key magnitudes at issue are subject to dispute. Presumably
having more government debt to service means having to raise more rev-
enue, all else equal, and in the absence of lump-sum taxes this means a
greater deadweight loss in the form of reduced incentives to work or
invest, as well as increased operational costs. On the other side, having a
large and liquid market for debt instruments with no default risk improves
the efﬁciency of the markets for private obligations as well. The U.S. cor-
porate bond market, for example, operates in a very different way today—
both in the pricing of new issues and in the opportunities for hedging
positions, and therefore for the implied cost of bearing risk—than it did
thirty years ago when legislative restrictions effectively prevented the
Treasury from issuing long-term bonds. In addition, outstanding nominal
debt theoretically provides ﬂexibility in the government’s response to eco-
nomic shocks, in that it can implicitly default on part or all of these obli-
gations through inﬂation—although the prospect of doing so ﬂies in the
face of not just calls for inﬂation targeting but the entire direction of the dis-
cussion of monetary policy over the last three decades.
22
Other aspects of the question, however, are less certain even analyti-
cally. To the extent that the holders of the government’s debt are not the
same as the taxpayers whose payments will service it, or to the extent that
those holders fail to internalize the connection even if the ultimate debt-
service liability does fall on them (and both of these considerations
appear to be empirically important), government debt is an asset in the
eyes of the public.
23 Holding either more or less of it therefore affects the
desired composition of the public’s portfolio of other assets and liabili-
ties, importantly including the desired stock of productive physical capi-
tal. Does having a government debt ratio of two to one therefore limit an
economy’s equilibrium capital intensity, compared with an economy
where the ratio is one to two? And what difference does it make if, as in
the United States today, the country is a chronic borrower from abroad, so
that a substantial fraction of the government’s debt (as of 2006, 44 per-
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22. See Hall and Krieger (2000), for example, for an exposition of this idea.
23. As Barro (1974) pointed out, the issue here is the extent to which government debt
is a net asset to the public that holds it. The subject has generated an enormous empirical
literature; see, for example, Bernheim (1987), Seater (1993), and Elmendorf and Mankiw
(1999).
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keted implicit liabilities, like those for future payments of Social Security
and Medicare beneﬁts, equivalent to market-held debt for purposes of
such questions? These liabilities currently dwarf the federal government’s
market debt but they bear no interest and therefore impose no explicit
deadweight loss associated with debt service.
Finally, and still more fundamentally, if the answer is that having one
government debt ratio versus another makes no difference for anything
real that matters in the economy, is the presumption that the economy
must have some stable level in equilibrium valid? That is, if going from
a debt ratio of X today to, say, 1.5X a decade from now makes no real
difference, why could the ratio not increase by 50 percent in the follow-
ing decade as well, and then again in the decade after that and the
decade after that? Presumably there are reasons why it cannot. (Again,
matters such as deadweight burdens of revenue collection are one
potential story, although only if the debt service is not also perpetually
financed.) But understanding in practical terms what those reasons are,
and over what time horizon they operate, would usefully inform think-
ing on fiscal policy at a more fundamental level than the ongoing debate
normally encompasses.
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General Discussion
Lawrence Summers suggested that although no one has explicitly rejected
the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry analysis, no central bank has explicitly adopted
that analysis in making monetary policy. The idea that the wage mechanism
behaves differently at 1 percent annual inﬂation than at 21⁄2 percent inﬂation
does not appear to be an important factor in central bank decisionmaking.
Insofar as central banks have adopted higher inflation targets, this has
occurred not because of concern about unemployment, but because of
concern about the implications of deﬂation for real interest rates.
George Perry replied that the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry ideas actually did
get some attention at the Federal Reserve and other central banks. A common
theme in the literature before the mid-1990s was that zero inﬂation is ideal,
even though people have understood the potential negative consequences
of deﬂation for a long time. Therefore the apparent decision by the Federal
Reserve not to pursue zero inﬂation may reﬂect some concern about the
trade-off with unemployment.
William Dickens added that the Bank of New Zealand had expressly
considered this research when making its decision to increase its inﬂation
target. Further, when many economists were advocating zero inﬂation in the
1990s, he, Akerlof, and Perry argued that this option should be taken off
the table, and this has since happened. In fact, all inﬂation-targeting central
banks currently target inﬂation in the 1 to 2 percent range.
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